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Choi: National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS V. FINLEY : A DISPUTE OVER THE “DECENCY
AND RESPECT” PROVISION

I. INTRODUCTION
Art is expression of ideas.1 People express their perceptions, ideas, feelings, and
values through the arts and literature, thus they are entitled to First Amendment2 and
Fifth Amendment3 protection.4 Since Congress incorporated the “decency and respect”
provisions into the National Endowment for the Arts (the “NEA”) guidelines, the NEA

1

Michael Wingfield Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship: The Aftermath of the NEA’s
New Funding Restrictions, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 937, 955 (1993) (“The purpose of art is to hold a
mirror up to society . . . our society loses something rare and precious every time we shut out
even a single voice.”).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” Id.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Id.
4
See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1976) (“[s]peech is protected not as a means to a collective good but
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1, 13 (1965) (“Literature and the arts . . . fall within the subjects of ‘governing importance’ that
the First Amendment absolutely protects from abridgment.”).
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has suffered intense scrutiny and criticism from the public.5 This provision has made
the organization unstable, affecting the development of effective policies and goals.6
There is substantial controversy over whether the government should be involved in
art funding.7 The purpose of this Note is to present and critique arguments both
supporting the “decency and respect” provision and those opposing it. Those who
support the clause state that although the people do not have a constitutional right to
receive funding, the “decency and respect” provision does not violate the people’s First
5

Senator Gordon argued that “the state owes all things to all people and has neither the
discretion nor the moral right to abstain from any facet of activity or to reject any petitioning
for funds.” 135 Cong. Rec. S5805-0, 5806 (1989). SECCA (Southeastern Center for
Contemporary Arts) is an organization that granted $15,000 to Andres Serrano for “Piss
Christ”. Id. In response, Senator Gordon also proposed that the NEA deprive SECCA of
Federal funding for a period of five years and until the agency shows that it will be
administered responsibly. Id.; see generally Grace Glueck, Border Skirmish: Art and Politics,
N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 19, 1989, § 2, at 1 (reporting on tensions between artists and lawmakers);
Kim Masters, Arts Panel Urges End to Grant Pledge, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1990, at G1
(describing meeting of NEA Council on proposed pledge of compliance for grant recipients);
Allan Parachini, Endowment, Congressmen Feud over Provocative Art, L.A. TIMES , June 14,
1989, § 6, at 1 (explaining escalating political controversy involving the NEA); see also Daniel
Mach, Note, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Public Spaces, and The First Amendment, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 429 (1997) (stating that “[t]he strict categorization that pervades public
forum analysis is ill-suited to the complex and inherently ambiguous nature of art in public
spaces. Consequently, courts have created an inconsistent, result-oriented jurisprudence of
public art”).
6
Craig Alford Masback, Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the Structural
Defects in the National Endowment for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 193-94 (1992)
(“The Congressional shift toward a more conservative consensus [by incorporating the
“decency and respect” provision in the Act] has undercut the bipartisan support for the arts
that existed at the NEA’s creation”) (citing M ARGARET W YSZOMIRSKI, Budgetary Politics and
Legislative Support: The Arts in Congress, in CONGRESS A ND THE A RTS: A PRECARIOUS
A LLIANCE? 28 (1985)). “Instead of working with Congress to develop art policies, the NEA
has been in a largely defensive posture concerning its process and program, operating
without a clear sense of purpose.” Id. at 194. Instead of allowing the NEA to independently
create its own art policies, Congress has undermined the NEA by actually controlling its grant
process and considerations. Id.
7
Michael J. Elston, Artists and Unconstitutional Conditions: The Big Bad Wolf Won’t
Subsidize Little Red Riding Hood’s Indecent Art, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 327 (1993)
(stating that the controversy between artistic expression and government funding has placed
the arts in a platform of political debate and has “focused attention to the ongoing debate
over unconstitutional conditions”); Robert M. O’Neil, Artistic Freedom and Academic
Freedom, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 189-91 (1990) (recognizing that the restrictions
placed on funded artists in the form of decency requirements have a ‘potential chilling effect’
on ‘bold and controversial works’ affecting both the artists themselves and the display
industry of museums and galleries).
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and Fifth Amendments.8 The provision is only a “consideration”, not a requirement.9
Opponents of the “decency and respect” provision argue that the First and Fifth
Amendments prohibit the government from controlling the content of the subsidized
arts.10
Part II of this Note provides a brief background on the establishment of the NEA.
Part III is the Statement of the Case providing a brief statement of facts, procedural
history, and the Supreme Court holding in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 11
Part IV is the Analysis of this Note where Part A discusses the First Amendment
provision regarding content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and
unconstitutional conditions.12 Part B will deal with the Fifth Amendment and the
dangers of overbreath and vagueness.13 Part C will discuss the possibilities of
dissolving the NEA. 14 Part D will discuss different options the NEA has to achieve a
compromise between its goals and the artistic views.15 This Note concludes that the

8

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179 (1998) (“Congress may
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way”). The Supreme Court overturned the lower court decisions and
determined that because this provision is not “viewpoint” discrimination, it is not in violation
of the First Amendment. Id. The Court also determined that the provision is not void for
vagueness; thus, it is not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2179-80; see also J.
Sarah Kim, Comment, Defending the Decency Clause in Finley v. Nat. Endowment for the
Arts, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . M EDIA & ENT . L.J. 627, 661 (1993) (stating that when Congress
incorporated the decency clause, it was not attempting to “control the search for political
truth” or to suppress dangerous ideas). By the very nature of the arts, it is somewhat
necessary to submerge into the content of such work to determine its “artistic merit.” Id. at
662.
9
Kim, supra note 8, at 662.
10
James Kilpatrick, Editorial, No Indecency at Public Expense, STATE J.REG. 4, June 26,
1998 (Springfield, IL), available in 1998 WL 14409729 quoting Finley:
I feel this is a great loss to our country . . . I’m disappointed because I feel that a lot
of people weren’t behind [the decency provision], like Clinton. He’s a democrat.
[The NEA] strikes me as a very dubious idea, for one thing, to create a system of
state-approved art. Government has no business saying that this painting gets a
seal of approval but this one does not. Such official patronage smacks more of
Stalinist Russia than of a free America.
Id.
11
118 S. Ct. at 2168.
12
See infra notes 56-83 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 112-126 and accompanying text..
15
See infra notes 127-149 and accompanying text.
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NEA should not be dissolved but instead Congress should consider four alternative
avenues in reaching a resolution between artists and the NEA. 16
II. BACKGROUND
Congress created the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
(“Foundation”) to “develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support
for the humanities and the arts in the United States.”17 The Foundation is composed of
several organizations, including the NEA. 18
The Foundation vests in the NEA
substantial discretion to award financial grants to support the arts.19 The purpose of
16

See infra notes 150-159 and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C. § 953(b) (1995) (“[T]he purpose of the [National] Foundation [on the arts] shall
be to develop and promote a broadly conceived national policy of support for the humanities
and the arts in the United States, and for institutions which preserve the cultural heritage of
the United States pursuant to this subchapter.”).
18
Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1995) (“[T]here is established a National Foundation on the Arts
and the Humanities . . . which shall be composed of a National Endowment for the Arts, a
National Endowment for the Humanities, a Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities,
and an Institute of Museum Services.”).
19
20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1995) provides the following:
The Chairperson, with the advice of the National Council on the Arts, is authorized
to establish and carry out a program of contracts with, or grants- in-aid or loans to,
groups or, in appropriate cases, individuals of exceptional talent engaged in or
concerned with the arts, for the purpose of enabling them to provide or support-(1) projects and productions which have substantial national or international artistic
and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American creativity and cultural
diversity and to the maintenance and encouragement of professional excellence; (2)
projects and productions, meeting professional standards or standards of
authenticity or tradition, irrespective of origin, which are of significant merit and
which, without such assistance, would otherwise be unavailable to our citizens for
geographic or economic reasons; (3) projects and productions that will encourage
and assist artists and enable them to achieve wider distribution of their works, to
work in residence at an educational or cultural institution, or to achieve standards of
professional excellence; (4) projects and productions which have substantial artistic
and cultural significance and that reach, or reflect the culture of, a minority, inner
city, rural, or tribal community; (5) projects and productions that will encourage
public knowledge, education, understanding, and appreciation of the arts; (6)
workshops that will encourage and develop the appreciation and enjoyment of the
arts by our citizens; (7) programs for the arts at the local level; (8) projects that
enhance managerial and organizational skills and capabilities; (9) projects,
productions, and workshops of the kinds described in paragraphs (1) through (8)
through film, radio, video, and similar media, for the purpose of broadening public
access to the arts; and (10) other relevant projects, including surveys, research,
planning, and publications relating to the purposes of this subsection. . . . Any
loans made by the Chairperson under this subsection shall be made in accordance
17
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the NEA is to establish a “program of contracts, grants-in-aid, or loans to . . .
individuals for projects and productions that are traditionally under-represented
recipients of financial assistance.”20 The NEA’s mission is to encourage American
creativity, cultural diversity, and professional excellence. 21 However, in order to assist
artists in achieving a wide distribution of their work, Congress imposed a requirement
that such artwork foster the mutual respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American society.22
Within the National Endowment for the Arts, there is a National Council on the Arts
(“Council”) which is composed of a Chairperson, three members of the House of
Representatives, two senators, and fourteen members appointed by the President.23
The members appointed by the President are individuals, publicly recognized for their
knowledge and expertise in the arts, which equitably represent women, minorities, and
persons with disabilities involved in the arts.24
According to the administrative provisions, the Chairperson must utilize advisory
panels to review the applications for projects, productions, and workshops.25 The
advisory panel must base its decision solely upon artistic excellence and merit.26 Once

with terms and conditions approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. In selecting
individuals and groups of exceptional talent as recipients of financial assistance to
be provided under this subsection, the Chairperson shall give particular regard to
artists and artistic groups that have traditionally been underrepresented.
20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1995).
20

Id.
20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1)-(3) (1995); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
22
20 U.S.C. § 951(6) (1995) (indicating the importance of the arts among citizens while
keeping in mind the different views and beliefs among all persons of the United States).
23
20 U.S.C. § 955(a)-(b)(1)(c) (1995) (establishing that two members of the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one
member of the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives, one Senator shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the
Senate, and one Senator shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate).
24
20 U.S.C. § 955(b) (1995) (“[The Council members are] private citizens of the United
States who are widely recognized for their knowledge . . . [and] interest in the arts; and have
established records of distinguished service, or achieved eminence in the arts; and . . . [The
members represent] practicing artists, civic cultural leaders, members of the museum
profession, and others who are professionally engaged in the arts; and . . . [who have a fair
representation of various arts] fields and interested citizen groups.”).
25
20 U.S.C. § 959(c) (1995) (establishing that the Chairperson shall issue regulations and
establish procedures to ensure that the advisory panel is composed of individuals
representing different geographic and ethnic backgrounds, minorities, and lay individuals
with diverse artistic and cultural backgrounds).
26
Id.
21
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the Chairperson receives a recommendation from the advisory panel, the Chairperson
must then make recommendations to the Council based upon both the advisory panel’s
decision and the Chairperson’s own opinions.27 The Council then makes a final
recommendation of whether to approve an application and the amount of financial
assistance if the application is granted.28 Although the Chairperson retains the final
authority to approve a grant application, the Chairperson cannot approve an application
that the Council has rejected.29
The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act (“Act”) requires the
Chairperson to establish guidelines to evaluate the artistic merit, the artist’s talent, and to
consider “general standards of decency.”30 The decency standard was set by Congress
after the endowment gave money to controversial works such as the homoerotic
images of Robert Mapplethorpe31 and Andres Serrano.32

27

Id.
20 U.S.C. § 955(f) (1995) (“indicating that the Council must “advise the Chairperson with
respect to policies, programs, and procedures for carrying out the Chairperson’s functions,
duties, or responsibilities . . . , and review applications for financial assistance . . . and make
recommendations for the approval and amount of financial assistance [if any] to provide to
each applicant”).
29
Id. The Chairperson alone cannot reach a final determination as to whether to approve
or disapprove an application until the Council gives the Chairperson its final recommendation
on such application. Id. If the Council approves an application, the Chairperson may still
reject the application. Id. If the Chairperson agrees and approves the application, he may
only provide the applicant the amount of financial assistance recommended by Council. Id. If
the Council rejects an application, the Chairperson has no authority to grant the application
but may only affirm the Council’s decision. Id.
30
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act § 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1995);
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103
Stat. 738 (1990). Congress also enacted an amendment providing that no NEA funds:
may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of
[the NEA] may be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals
engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
103 Stat. at 738-42.
31
See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998). In Robert
Mapplethorpe’s situation, the NEA granted him $30,000 for exhibiting his photographs of
homoerotic scenes such as a man urinating into another’s mouth. Id.; see also, 135 CONG.
REC. 58762-01, 58809 (1989).
32
118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998). Serrano filled a bottle with his own urine and then placed a
crucifix with Jesus Christ in the bottle and then took a picture of it. Id. For that the NEA gave
Serrano $15,000 to honor him as an artist. Id.; see also, 135 Cong. Rec. S5594-01 (daily ed.
May 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (stating that works of art such as Serrano’s
should not be given support, especially, when the taxpayer’s money is being used to finance
28
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts
Karen Finley is a performer best known for a monologue in which she coated her
bare breasts with chocolate, which looked like feces, to symbolize women’s
oppression.33 She then proceeded to describe, using some profanity and several novel
dance steps, an imagined sexual assault.34 In 1990, she applied to the NEA for a grant
to subsidize her performance. 35 The NEA’s Performance Artists Program Peer Review
Panel reviewed a total of ninety applications, and recommended that eighteen
applications be funded, including Finley’s.36 However, the Council recommended
disapproval and, subsequently, NEA Chairman John E. Frohnmayer denied Finley’s
application for funding.37 Finley subsequently brought suit against the NEA alleging a
violation of her constitutional and statutory rights.38 Specifically, Finley sought a
declaration that the decency and respect provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) were in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.39

the works). D’Amato further stated that “If [people] want free speech, [people] want to draw
dirty pictures, [people] want to do anything you want, that is [their] business, but not with
taxpayers’ money. . . . On what conceivable basis does anyone who would engage in such
blasphemy and insensitivity toward the religious community deserve to be honored?” Id.
33
Mordecai Rosenfeld, A Bittersweet Controversy, N.Y.L. J., Sept. 2, 1998, at 2.
34
Id.
35
Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d,
100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. In June 1990, NEA Chairman John E. Frohnmayer polled members of the Council by
individual telephone calls concerning the Performance Artists Program grants. Id. After
receiving their denial, Finley, along with three other individuals whose applications were
denied, filed this suit. Id. They asserted that the NEA and Frohnmayer violated their
constitutional and statutory rights by improperly denying their applications for NEA funds
and by releasing to the public information from their application forms. Id. at 1460. Indeed,
the district court correctly found that the Chairperson violated the application process
established by Congress to consider grants. The Chairperson should not have approached
each member individually but should have demanded all members meet and come to a joint
resolution. The Chairperson’s approach opened the door to possibilities of coercion and bias
votes from the members. The NEA should have demanded the Chairperson and the
committee members to reconsider the four individual applications and then vote. However,
because the NEA did not pursue this issue on appeal, it is rendered moot.
39
Id. at 1460 (challenging section 954(d)(1) where “artistic excellence and artistic merit are
the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

B. Procedural History
The district court found that the decency clause violated the First Amendment on its
face by unfairly precluding some forms of protected speech and that the clause was
unpermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment.40 The district court rejected the
NEA’s argument that “decency” and “respect” were simply implicit and voluntary
guidelines in funding decisions.41 Instead, the court stated that the clause represented
explicit criteria to determine eligibility for the NEA grants and that an overbroad statute
would restrict both protected and unprotected speech.42 The court held that while the
government may constitutionally regulate “obscene” speech, the decency clause may
repress “indecent” speech, a form of expression clearly immune from substantial
governmental interference. 43
Finally, the court argued that in certain “protected” areas, such as public education
funding, government grants “may not be used to suppress unpopular expression.”44
Since both “academic expression and artistic expression reached the core of a
democratic society’s cultural and political vitality,” the court found that, similar to
education funding, art funding demanded education neutrality.45 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings and ruled in Finley’s favor.46
40

Id. at 1468, 1471.
Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (“Had
Congress believed that ‘decency’ and ‘respect for diverse views’ were naturally embedded in
the concept of ‘artistic merit,’ there would be no need to elaborate on the [artistic merit]
standard”), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S.
Ct. 2168 (1998).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1472; see, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(“[E]xpression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978) (“Prurient appeal is an element of the
obscene, but the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with
accepted standards of morality.”).
44
Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475; see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (finding that
since public universities operate in a “traditional sphere of free expression fundamental to the
functioning of our society,” they are a protected class under the First Amendment).
45
Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1473-74 (surveying the NEA’s legislative history and recognizing
the high ideals and ethics embedded in the Act, the court found that “artistic expression
served many of the societal values as scholarly expression in [the field of public education]”).
Also, the court found that since the NEA makes many of its grants in a university setting,
artistic activity in the classroom deserves the same freedom as that given to other educational
activities. Id.
46
Id. at 1468, 1471; Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-83 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that the decency clause failed to notify applicants adequately of what is
required of them because “persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the
meaning and differ as to the application” of the decency clause). The court stated that
41
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C. Supreme Court Holding
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the
decency clause does not inherently interfere with the First Amendment right to free
expression and it does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s void for vagueness
provision.47 The Court found that 20 U. S.C. § 954(d)(1) merely adds “considerations,”
or factors, to the grant-making process. 48 It does not state that all grants should be
denied to applications involving “indecent” or “disrespectful” artworks.49 Although the
statute does not state how much weight the Advisory Commission Council or
Chairperson should give to these factors, the NEA has wide discretion in considering
this provision.50
Furthermore, the Court stated that in order to succeed, Finley carried the burden of
demonstrating that there is “a substantial risk that the application of [the decency
clause] will lead to the suppression of speech.”51 However, the Court found that the
provision on its face was very clear in that the “decency and respect” provision is only
a consideration,52 it is not a provision that compels the Chairperson to require “decency
and respect” in every application.53 Because the very nature of the subject matter is
decency and respect are “contentless in the context of American society: the very nature of
our pluralistic society is that there are an infinite number of values and beliefs and,
correlatively, there may be no national ‘general standards of decency.’ ” Id. at 680; see also
George Vetter, Esq. & Christopher C. Roche, Esq., The First Amendment and The Artist – Part
I, 44 R.I. B.J. 7, 17 (1996) (stating that although the NEA has not denied an application based
upon the decency clause, critics believe that NEA is manipulating and channeling the
decency clause through the “artistic excellence” requirement).
47
National Endowment for the Arts, v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2172 (1998).
48
Id. at 2175 (stating that the NEA implements the “decency and respect” provision by
organizing an advisory panel which represents a wide variety of race and educational
background, beliefs, and aesthetic views).
49
Id.
50
Id. (finding that the “decency and respect” criterion does not prohibit artists from
expressing themselves). It is a factor that the committee may consider when evaluating an
application for a grant. Id. It is not a mandatory factor that the committee must consider. Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. (finding that the “decency and respect” provision is viewpoint discrimination
because “it rejects any artistic speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends
standards of decency.”).
53
Id. at 2177 (finding that the respect and decency provisions would not introduce “any
greater element of selectivity than the determination on the basis of artistic excellence”). The
Court stated that they are not willing to start speculating as to possible cases where the
decency and respect provisions would in fact threaten ideas. Id. Finley did not argue that
the reason why their applications were denied was because they were in violation of the
decency and respect provisions nor did they present any specific instances were the NEA
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open to different interpretations, the Court determined that in the context of selected
artistic subsidies it is not possible at all times for Congress to legislate with clarity54 and
it is difficult to establish a precise criterion when granting subsidies.55
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The First Amendment
“Above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”56
1. Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on Speech
When the NEA determines whether to grant funding to an artwork based on artistic
merit, it must consider how the subject matter, viewpoint, and mode of expression
relate and harmonize with each other and to the effectiveness of the work of art.57
Content is a broad concept that encompasses whole subjects of discussion regardless
of the “viewpoint” expressed.58 A viewpoint may be defined as the way an individual
perceives or observes the world around him.59 Also, subject matter may be defined as
the thing that it is being represented, drawn, or painted in the work of art.60 Mode of
expression is the means by which the artwork is expressed.61

denied an application based upon these provisions. Id. The Court stated that just as much it
is conceded that different people interpret respect and decency in different ways, “artistic
excellence” is also open to different interpretations. Id.
54
Id. at 2179 (recognizing that the artist may develop their artistic work taking into account
the decision-making criteria from the NEA when funding works). However, since “the
government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are
not constitutionally severe.” Id.
55
Id. at 2180 (stating that if the decency and respect provisions are unconstitutionally
vague, “then so too are all government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the
basis of subjective criteria such as excellence”).
56
Police Dep’t. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
57
Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1976) (“Funding
decisions based on literary or artistic worth are unavoidably based in some part on . . . subject
matter or content. . . .”).
58
Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 101 (1996).
59
Id. at 120 (stating that this is the most ambiguous and subjective element of expression).
60
Amy Sabrin, Essay, Thinking about Content: Can it Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1219 (1993). For instance, in Van
Gogh’s painting “Sunflowers,” the subject matter is a vase filled with sunflowers. In Oliver
Twist, the subject matter is an orphan in nineteenth-century London. Id.
61
Id. (explaining that visual art work, for instance, may be represented through an oil paint,
a sculpture, a water paint, or a photograph).
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Finley argued that the “decency and respect” provision is viewpoint discrimination
because it censors any artwork that does not fall within the “mainstream” of public
moral values.62 Indeed, Justice O’Connor has stated that the “First Amendment
prohibits content based restriction of speech unless the government can show that such
regulation is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.”63 The Court
found that by denying funds, the NEA is not prohibiting the artist from pursuing his
work elsewhere, the denial is only in reference to a grant.64 Despite the fact that the
decency criteria invites a subjective determination from the NEA, it does not seem to
introduce a greater element of subjectivity than “artistic excellence” itself.65
62

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2175 (1998).
Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
64
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2177; see, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, a monologue was broadcast over the radio about seven dirty words
which “you definitely wouldn’t say ever” on the public airwaves. Id. at 726. A motorist
complained to the FCC claiming that he heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.
Id. at 726. The FCC concluded that the broadcast was “indecent” but not obscene. Id. at
726. The FCC argued that it was not claiming that it could ban non-obscene language at all
times. Id. at 727. Rather, it claimed that principles analogous to those of nuisance could be
applied, making context all-important. Id. Thus, the FCC believed they could prohibit
broadcasting this kind of language when children most probably would be listening. Id.The
Supreme Court found that even if it involves protected language under the First Amendment,
the FCC had the right to take content into account and prohibit language where it is
especially offensive. Id. at 728. Appellants in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617
(1973), argued that the Oklahoma statute’s prohibition to actively participating in political
activities would not only prohibit them from partisan political ideologies but will also limit
their expressions and views when manifested ‘privately.’ However, the Court found
illegitimacy in this argument when the State Personnel Board and the State Attorney General
have interpreted the restriction as solely prohibiting ‘clearly partisan political activity.’ Id.
The Board interpreted that “[The Act’s] reservation is subject to the prohibition that such
persons may not take active part in political management or in political campaigns only.” Id.
at 618 n.15.
65
Id.; see also National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2177 (1998)
(stating that “Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grantmaking process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.”). If a grant is to be
awarded, it is necessary to consider these factors to determine whether the artist is entitled to
the award. Id. at 2178. The government cannot fund all art or all groups that need funding.
Id. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that
since choices must be made, it is inherent that these choices will be made “with an eye to
content.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make
Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST . L. REV. 199, 205 (1994) (comparing the government
funding artwork to a public library that will have to make content based choices concerning
which books and magazines to buy because the funds and bookshelves are limited in
quantity); see, e.g., Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 566 (9th Cir. 1984)
(reviewing whether the city of Burbank could refuse performers Blue Oyster Cult, Todd
Rundgren, and Jackson Browne from playing at the city auditorium); Brown v. Board of
63
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2. Unconstitutional Conditions
Unconstitutional condition stands for the proposition that Congress cannot condition
the granting of a benefit by asking the recipient to give-up a constitutional right.66 The
doctrine expresses the view that an individual’s constitutional rights are absolute and
non-negotiable. 67 For instance, in Perry v. Sindermann, 68 the Court explained that
“even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely.”69 That is, the government
may not “deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests . . . .”70
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed whether NEA’s funding
policies constitute unconstitutional conditions.71 The Court did not interpret the NEA’s
guidelines for subsidizing art as a prohibition on the exercise of a fundamental right or a
system to impose conditions on the exercise of First Amendment Constitutional rights.72
The Supreme Court found that the guidelines were a form of recognizing works that
Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986) (considering whether it was permissible for the
University of Nebraska to refuse to show in the movie “Hail Mary,” which depicted the birth
of Christ in a contemporary setting); Chemerinsky, supra, at 205 (finding that content-based
choices are sometimes inevitable in circumstances where the government must decide
whether to allow a play or a concert based on content in a public forum).
66
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1476-89
(1989).
67
Id. at 1478.
68
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
69
Id. at 597; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (“The procedural device
[at issue] must necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly. . . .
result[ing] in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.”); Elston, supra note
7, at 345 (asserting some examples of situations where unconstitutional condition might
occur). For instance, a program granting medical benefits to recipients depending on whether
they choose to give birth or have an abortion would present an unconstitutional condition.
Id. But cf. Lyng v Int’l. Union, 485 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1988) ( finding that an unconstitutional
condition did not exist when a program provides food stamps depending on whether union
members were on strike or lost their jobs for other reasons).
70
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
71
See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (finding a policy of not subsidizing the
exercise of a fundamental right differs in an important respect from a prohibition on the
exercise of a fundamental right); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (holding that the
government may choose to subsidize medically necessary services and not to subsidize
abortions); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (holding that “[The government] may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes . . . [on the beneficiary’s] interest in freedom of speech.”).
72
See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 312; Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
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otherwise would never have been recognized by the public.73 In addition, the Court
found that when the NEA refuses an application, it does not prevent or prohibit the
individual or organization from pursuing its artwork.74 Indeed, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)
adds “considerations” or factors to the grant-making process,75 it does not state that all
grants should be denied to applications involving “indecent” or “disrespectful” art
works.76 Also, 20 U.S.C. § 954 does not state how much weight the Advisory
Commission, Council or Chairperson should give to this factor, only that the factor be
taken into consideration.77
In 1990, Congress created an Independent Commission of Constitutional Law
Scholars to review the NEA’s grant making procedure. 78 The Commission concluded
that there is no constitutional obligation to provide arts funding, but recommended that
the Chairperson exercise extreme caution when establishing procedures setting forth
content restrictions.79
Although the “decency and respect” provision is not a categorical determination of
whether to grant funding, in those circumstances when it is a factor and the application
73

See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 312; Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
National Endowment for the Arts, v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179 (1998); see also Paul N.
Rechenberg, Losing the Battle on Obscenity, But Can We Win the War? The National
Endowment for the Arts’ Fight Against Funding Obscene Artistic Works, 57 M O. L. REV. 299,
300 (1992) (stating that some artistic work which has gone beyond nudity has triggered such
debate that artists are finding themselves defending their artistic works).
75
20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1995) (“in establishing such regulations and procedures, the
Chairperson shall ensure that – artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect
for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public . . . .”).
76
But see, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380, 393 (1992) (invalidating the municipal
ordinance that made it a criminal offense to place a symbol on public or private property
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender”). That provision disfavored
specific subjects and suppressed “distinctive, idea[s], conveyed by a distinctive message.”
Id.
77
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175 (stating that the NEA implements the “decency and respect”
provision by organizing an advisory panel which represents a wide variety of race and
educational background, beliefs, and aesthetic views). The Court found that [Finley] did not
allege discrimination in any particular funding decision. Id. at 2178. “In fact, after filing suit
to challenge § 954(d)(1), two of the individual respondents received NEA grants.” Id.
78
Independent Commission, Report to Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts
83, 89, 3 Record, Doc. No. 151, Exh. K. (Sept. 1990) (recommending procedural changes to
enhance the role of advisory panels and a statute which would affirm “the high place the
nation accords to the fostering of mutual respect for the disparate beliefs and values among
us”).
79
Id. at 89.
74
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is rejected, the applicant may claim unfairness and bias.80 Because 20 U.S.C. § 954 is a
federal statute and it is binding on every state, the general standards of “decency and
respect” will be measured with the beliefs and values of the general American public.81
This presents a problem because it may be very difficult for a person from California to
evaluate his work and consider whether it is respectful and decent for a person from
Alaska. 82 Even if the committee that recommends the art work is diverse enough to
carry various perspectives, backgrounds, and appreciation for the arts, there will be
problems.83
B. Tolerating Vagueness
The Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford84 provided that vague statutes and
regulations violate important values.85 First, the regulation will not provide an innocent
individual appropriate warning as to unlawful or impermissible conduct.86 Second,
because the courts enforce statutes or regulations, a regulation that is vague will have a
discriminatory impact on innocent people. 87 Third, a regulation that is vague will inhibit
people from exercising their constitutional freedoms, such as freedom of expression.88
The NEA plays a strong and influential role in the financial affairs of artistic funding
in the United States.89 Most private funding sources believe that when NEA denies a
80

20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)(1995); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973). The
Court determined whether the obscenity standards should be based upon community or
national standards. Id. The Court was very concerned about applying national standards
from one state to another because the Nation is so diverse in backgrounds that it would be
too abstract to require a national formulation. Id. Each state should be viewed as an entity
with its own communal personality and standards. Id. It would be unfair, vague, and
unrealistic to apply the “personality and standards” from one state upon another. Id. The
Court believed that enforcing a national standard would impose on the people of this Nation
the heavy burden of trying to understand the standards of one state with respect to their
own. Id.
81
Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
82
Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (“[P]eople in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and
this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity”).
83
Id.
84
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
85
Id. at 108.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 108-09 “[A] vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . .
[government officials] for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”).
88
Id. (“[U]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful
zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked”).
89
Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (1991) (“[B]ecause
the NEA provides much of its support with conditions that require matching or co-funding
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grant, it means that the artist’s work is deficient of artistic merit and value. 90 Thus,
once the NEA denies a grant to an applicant, the applicant may stand in a
disadvantageous position in terms of attracting private funding sources. 91 Thus, it is
very important that the NEA construe its standards of review as clearly and specifically
as possible. 92
Indeed, the Supreme Court argued in Finley that because the nature of art is open to
different interpretations, to ask Congress to enact precise guidelines for evaluating grant
applications is literally impossible. 93 As Chief Justice Warren stated, no individual could
from private sources, the NEA’s funding involvement in a project necessarily has a multiplier
effect in the competitive market for funding of artistic endeavors”).
90
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2177-78 (1998) (explaining that
as a result of the limited funds available to the NEA, even if the agency wished to grant all
applications, it could not realistically do so); see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193
(1991) (holding that Congress may fund some specific activities over others so long as it is in
the public interest and it does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint). “In [choosing one
activity over the other], the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.” Id. When the NEA
turns down an application, it should not be viewed as blacklisting the denied applicants as
artists with indecent or disrespectful work that is unworthy of merit. Id. Just because
universities grant scholarships to meritorious students does not mean that the student who
was turned down is not likely to succeed or unworthy of recognition. Id. The NEA, just like
universities, can only do so much and they should not be condemned as violating an
applicant’s First Amendment rights when it denies an application. Id.
91
Bella Lewitzky Dance Found., 754 F. Supp. at 783. In Bella, a nonprofit corporation
applied for an NEA grant and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of requiring
that grant recipients certify that funds awarded would not be used to promote or produce
obscene material. Id. at 773. The applicants claimed that the vagueness of the certification
forced grant recipients to avoid even “coming close to the line between what is merely
provocative and what is proscribed.” Id. at 782. The applicant believed that many legitimate
artistic projects would not be undertaken for fear of violating the vague terms of the
certification. Id. The court found that “the creative expression of . . . [the applicant] would
necessarily be tempered were [the applicant] to sign the certification and then take seriously
[the applicant’s] pledge not to promote, disseminate or produce anything that the NEA in its
judgment might find obscene.” Id. at 783. The court also stated that the chilling effect of the
certification would be multiplied by the fact that the NEA occupies an influential role in the
world of art. Id. “Most non-federal funding sources regard the NEA award as an imprimatur
that signifies the recipient’s artistic merit and value.” Id.
92
Id. at 783.
93
Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179 (stating that because artists are in a country where different
people of different backgrounds, ideas, and morals live, Congress must establish guidelines
that are as clear and specific as possible to help artists understand their rights and limits.); see
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 28 (1973) (finding that in order to create harmony and
attention to the political and social opinions from the people, it is necessary to provide
guidelines enabling people to know and understand their rights; each person’s rights end
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require the government to choose between absolute freedom of expression or complete
repression.94 The Supreme Court has consistently held that “lack of precision in
[obscenity statutes] is not in itself offensive to the requirements of due process.”95
Thus, the issue is whether the NEA’s “respect and decency” standard conveys
sufficient warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices.96
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the regulation of speech or
any form of expression carries an “inherent danger” of chilling speech.97 The statutes
that regulate expression must be drafted carefully and specifically limited to regulate
obscenity.98 Since literary and artistic work is a form of speech that is open to many
different interpretations or points of view, it is important that the artist express his
thoughts and emotions, keeping in mind how other people will view and react to this
form of speech.99

where others begin).
94
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren C. J. dissenting) (“No government . .
. should be forced to choose between repressing all material, including that within the realm of
decency, and allowing unrestrained license to publish any material, no matter how vile. There
must be a rule of reason in this as in other areas of the law.”).
95
Miller, 413 U.S. at 28; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1877) (“The Constitution
does not require impossible standards . . . [All that is required is that] the language conveys
sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices.”).
96
Miller, 413 U.S. at 28.
97
Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19 (acknowledging that the States have a legitimate interest in
controlling the dissemination of obscenity when the vehicle of dissemination will reach and
offend the sensibilities of individuals such as children and juveniles).
98
Id. at 25. This case established basic guidelines for a trier of fact to determine whether a
work of art is obscene:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards”
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. This case extended the definition of obscenity to include those works which are “utterly”
without social value, but which do not have “serious” value. Id. The case also presented
several examples of materials which could be banned such as “patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated
and patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions,
and lewd exhibition of the genitals.” Id. at 26-7.
99
Id. at 27.
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It is necessary to consider a “common sense” analysis for statutory interpretation.100
For instance, in Broadrick, et al. v. Oklahoma, 101 the Oklahoma State Personnel Board
charged state employees with actively participating in political activities in violation of
the State Merit System Act.102 Although appellants acknowledged the benefits of this
policy as it guaranteed the employee a work environment free from wrongful political
impositions and extortion,103 they brought this action claiming that two paragraphs of
the Act were invalid because of overbreadth and vagueness.104
The Supreme Court found that those paragraphs gave adequate warning and “explicit
standards” to the state employees.105 However, although the English language provides
so many words to express ideas, the Court found that the Act was written in such a
way that an ordinary individual using his ordinary common sense could sufficiently
understand and comply with the provisions of the Act.106
Balancing all arguments presented in this Note, artists have a legitimate concern that
their views will be misinterpreted.107 Decency and respect vary from person to person
and fall within a gray area, making it difficult for an artist to keep in mind these two
factors when creating their work.108 When an educational institution promotes
“excellence” by providing scholarships, there are factors that give an individual a good
idea of what “excellence” means, such as academic performance, community services,
personal experiences, and personal development.109 But when the government must use
its discretion in determining what art it will fund, imposing upon artists a decency and
respect criterion when evaluating their work is too vague and a heavy burden.110 Thus,
100

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973).
Id.
102
Id. Section 818, paragraph six, provided that “no classified service employee ‘shall
directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving
any assessment . . . or contribution for any political organization, candidacy or other political
purpose.’ ” Id. at 606. The seventh paragraph provided that no service employee “shall
belong to any national, state or local committee of a political party, or an officer or member of
a committee of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid
public office.” Id.
103
Id. at 606.
104
Id. at 607.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 680-83 (9th Cir. 1996).
108
Id.
109
See e.g., 2 U.S.C.§ 802 (1995) (establishing the Congressional Award Program to
“promote initiative, achievement, and exc ellence among youths in the areas of public service,
personal development, and physical and expedition fitness”); 20 U.S.C. § 1134h(a) (1995)
(authorizing the Secretary of Education to award fellowships to “students of superior ability
selected on the basis of demonstrated achievement and exceptional promise”).
110
Sabrin, supra note 60, at 1221 (stating that disqualifying art with specified offensive
101
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in order to prevent the NEA from being a highly visible target of scrutiny, Congress
should strike the decency and respect standard.111
C. Dissolving the NEA.
As a result of the political attacks and budget cuts, the NEA once again has
restructured its grant process.112 Under this new approach, the NEA is refraining from
granting applications to individuals and instead is focusing on funding arts
organizations.113 However, those who oppose the federal organization believe this
approach is only rerouting the problem.114 The NEA’s approval and endorsement now
will go to an art organization, which in turn will decide which individual projects will get
the NEA funding.115 Thus, in the end, NEA grants will continue to negatively affect
individual artists.116
Recently, Congress has threatened to dissolve the NEA because it has failed to
formulate an adequate framework on which the NEA may base their grant decisions.117
If the NEA is dissolved, there will be no more issues before the courts as to whether
the NEA is violating an individual’s rights by holding moral beliefs within certain
parameters the government finds appropriate. 118 Also, artists will be able to express
viewpoints as artistically not meritorious will generate inconsistent outcomes because it is
open to subjective interpretation). “One mans’ vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Id. (citing Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
111
Finley v. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating
“professional evaluations of artistic merit are permissible, but decisions based on the wholly
subjective criterion of ‘decency’ are not”) aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 2168 (1997), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d
560, 575-77 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that a city may dedicate a public forum to certain categories
of expression but may not deny access to performers based on their political views or their
unorthodox manner of expression).
112
Priya Sara Cherian, Promoting the Arts by Dissolving the National Endowment for the
Arts, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 129, 145 (1997).
113
Deborah Bradley, Government Cuts Grants for Artists; NEA Official Tries to Explain
How to Cope, DALLAS M ORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1996, at A29.
114
Cherian, supra note 112, at 145.
115
Id. at 145-146 (stating that even if the NEA is dissolved, the government already has
established incentive to those people who voluntarily help the arts by making their donations
tax-deductible; thus, it is unnecessary and inadequate to force the American people to
participate in art programs which they do not support).
116
Id. at 146.
117
Vetter & Roche, supra note 46, at 17 (“As Congress trims the budget in keeping with
the much publicized ‘Contract with America,’ the NEA could be abolished or its budget
simply not reauthorized.”).
118
Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 331
(1995) (stating that it is never appropriate for Congress to regulate a private individual’s
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their thoughts and feelings through their artwork without congressional influence. 119 It
has been estimated that eliminating the NEA will save $170 million, or about 68 cents
per citizen.120 Those who oppose the NEA assert that the government is affecting the
art so much, that an artist whose application is rejected will have a much harder time
getting funding.121
However, eliminating the NEA will substantially reduce support to the arts.122
Federal support of non-profit organizations and individuals involves financial support,
prestige, and it attracts private entities to contribute to the art endorsement.123 Thus,
removing the NEA will eliminate financial support from the federal government and
private entities will lose motivation to further recognize promising arts.124 Although the
percentage the NEA contributes to the total funding of a grantee is small, the benefits an
organization receives through the exposure and the recognition by the federal
government is outstanding.125 The federal government helps underrepresented artwork
attract collateral funding from local and regional private sources.126
D. Possible Solutions
Instead of dissolving the NEA, there are alternative avenues Congress should
consider in reaching a resolution between the Constitution and the artist.127 First, the
beliefs and behavior if Congress’ primary motivation in enforcing the decency clause is to
impose the moral beliefs of those in Congress).
119
See id.
120
Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression? First Amendment
Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 A M.
U. L. REV. 353, 404 (1995).
121
Cherian, supra note 112, at 146.
122
Leff, supra note 120, at 404 (stating that since 1978, NEA contributed approximately
eleven percent of the total funding to non-profit organizations).
123
Id. at 405.
124
Id. at 404. “Loss of federal funding would also reduce the diversification of nongovernmental fundraising by arts organizations and individuals. It would remove the
statutory compulsion to seek out matching grants because the prestige of federal support
that attracts such private initiatives would be missing.” Id.
125
Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (1991) (citing amicus
brief of Theatre Communications Group which called NEA grant awards “critical to the ability
of artists and companies to attract non-federal funding sources”).
126
Leff, supra note 120, at 404 (stating that since the NEA was founded in 1966 the number
of art organizations helping the nation has increased over ten times).
127
Cf., H.R.Rep. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186,
3190. “[T]he Foundation would serve not only to deepen our understanding of our friends
and allies throughout the world, but would strengthen the projection of our Nation’s cultural
life abroad and enable us better to overcome the increasing ‘cultural offensive’ being waged
by Communist ideologies.” Id.
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Chairperson should document the specific purpose of the award and criteria that the
committee members and she followed to reach the conclusion as to whether an
application should be granted or denied.128 In this manner, if the grant is challenged,
there will be sufficient evidence for a court to determine whether the NEA’s decision in
any way violated the applicant’s Constitutional rights.129 This way, the committee and
the Chairperson will be even more cautious in considering applications.130 The
committee and the Chairperson will be more aware that their decision may be subject to
review by a court.131 This will encourage them to pay attention to the “artistic merit”
of the work.132 In the long run, artworks that truly have very little artistic value will not
be funded, and the courts and Congress will have fewer reasons to challenge those
decisions.133
Second, the decency and respect provisions of the enabling statute should be
repealed.134 Following the rationale from Miller and contrary to the Supreme Court’s
holding in Finley, it is impossible to expect an artist to create artwork keeping in mind a
“national community standard” of decency and respect.135 The NEA could focus only
on the artistic excellence of the work.136 Based upon the artist’s detailed description of
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the work, the committee members should use their expertise in the arts to resolve
whether the artist is entitled to receive taxpayers’ money.137
Third, the NEA should adopt an open door policy were applicants would have the
opportunity to come before the committee members and advocate their work.138 The
artists should be given the opportunity to be heard and express their reasons why their
artwork is entitled to receive the committee’s vote. 139 The advantage of this procedure
is that the applicant will have less reason to believe that his artwork was misunderstood
or misjudged.140 Critics to this option have expressed concern that the grants will be
based upon the ability of the artist to be eloquent and savvy.141 However, in the legal
arena, unless the attorney is savvy, eloquent, and witty, the client will stand little chance
of winning.142 Indeed, arguments are a determinative factor in our judicial system, but
it is not the only factor that determines whether the client will win or lose. 143 For the
same reason, this proposed option does not have to be the only determinative factor
when approving an application. This option could be implemented along with one or
more of the options enumerated in this note. 144
Fourth, based upon the description submitted by the artist and their view and
appreciation of the artwork, the committee members and Chairperson should ask: (1)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value, 145 and (2) whether the public in general will most likely appreciate and
understand the message the artist is trying to convey through his work.146 In Finley’s
137
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case, she never supported why her work was worthy of artistic excellence. 147 It is
uncertain whether the public would understand that her monologue in which she coated
her bare breasts with chocolate, was meant to symbolize the oppression of women.148
In short, these options will help the applicant understand the basis upon which the NEA
will make its funding.149
V. CONCLUSION
The Art is the only means many people find that truly expresses their feelings,
worries, and thoughts.150 The “decency and respect” provision that the Supreme Court
upheld in Finley is not appropriate in federal funding.151 Even if the “decency and
respect” provision is only a factor that the NEA may consider when determining who is
entitled to receive a grant, it is very likely that it will hamper viewpoints which might be
misunderstood.152 It is impossible to apply a national contemporary standard of
decency and respect.153 Moral values are very different from state to state and it is
wrong to impose values from one state upon the other.154 Thus, Congress should
repeal the “decency and respect” provision and consider artwork for its artistic
excellence alone. 155
Factors that may help reduce the amount of speculation, litigation, and censorship
against the NEA are: (1) create a paper trail where applicants will understand why their
artwork is not being funded;156 (2) establish an open door policy where the artists will
have an opportunity to explain why their work is entitled to receive tax-payers’
money;157 (3) consider whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value;158 and (4) consider whether the public in general
will most likely appreciate and understand the message the artist is trying to convey
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through his work.159 Repealing the “decency and respect” clause and implementing
these factors will be the best solution for artists and the NEA.
Alicia M. Choi
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